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BEYOND THE MEDICAL MODEL: A RATIONALE
FOR INFANTICIDE LEGISLATION
Karen Brennan, School of Law, Queen's University Belfast*
Introduction
"These statutory provisions were enacted not to recognize
legally the connection between childbirth and infanticide, but
to create it . . . The terms of the infanticide laws are ... their
own justification."'
Infanticide legislation was first introduced in England and Wales in 1922.
The Infanticide Act 1922 was later amended by the 1938 Infanticide Act.
2
The 1922 and 1938 Acts have provided the model for other infanticide
measures which have been enacted in a number of jurisdictions, including
the Republic of Ireland,3 Canada,4 Hong Kong,5 Fiji,6 New Zealand,7 and a
number of Australian jurisdictions such as New South Wales' and Victoria.9
The general purpose of these legislative measures is to make lenient
provision for mothers who kill their children, usually within one year of
birth,"0 in tragic circumstances. The basis or rationale of infanticide
I would like to thank Professor Kieran McEvoy and Dr. Tarik Kochi for their
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Osborne, "The Crime of Infanticide: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water"
(1987) 6 CanJFL 47, at 55, referring to Nigel Walker's description of the
legislation as "an interesting example of myth making by legislation"; see Walker,
Crime and Insanity, vol. 1 (1968), p. 136.
2 S. 1(1) provides for the offence of infanticide; see infra at n.78. S. 1(2) provides for
the defence of infanticide. The Infanticide Act 1922, was applied to Northern
Ireland by the Uniformity of Laws Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. The infanticide
measure was subsequently repealed and re-enacted with the relevant modifications
introduced by the 1938 English measure; see Infanticide Act (Northern Ireland)
1939.
3 Infanticide Act, 1949.
4 Criminal Code, s.233 [R.S., c. C-34, s.216]. See also, s.662(3), which provides that
on a charge of murdering an infant a jury may find a woman guilty of manslaughter
or infanticide, if the evidence proves either of these offences, instead of murder.
5 Cap 212, Offences Against the Person Ordinance, s.47C.
6 Penal Code [Cap. 171, s.205.
7 Crimes Act 1961, s. 178
8 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s.22A
9 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic.), s.6, as amended by the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic.),
s.5.
10 The New Zealand measure covers the culpable killing of children under the age of
10 years. This measure is different from other infanticide measures in a number of
other ways. S. 178 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that a woman will be guilty of
infanticide, rather than murder or manslaughter, where she causes the death of any
child of hers aged under ten years while the balance of her mind is disturbed, to
such an extent that she should not be held fully responsible, by reason of her not
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that child or any other
child, or by reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason of any disorder
consequent upon childbirth or lactation. As in England and Wales, infanticide is
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legislation is medical in nature in that the leniency it provides for is justified
on the basis that at the time of the killing the balance of the mother's mind
was disturbed due to the effects of childbirth or lactation. Infanticide
generally operates as an alternative to a murder charge or conviction, and, in
this way, it is both a substantive homicide offence and a partial defence to
murder. In relation to its seriousness as a species of homicide, infanticide is
similar to manslaughter; for example, the English measure provides that a
woman who is charged with or convicted of infanticide is to be dealt with
and punished as if she had been charged with or convicted of manslaughter.
Infanticide legislation has been criticised for a number of reasons. The
accusations levelled against it are, inter alia, that it lowers the status of infant
life," and, because it is available for mothers only, is paternalistic and
reinforces gender stereotypes.12 This article will focus on one of the most
significant criticisms of this legislation: the fact that its medical foundation
may not be justified. I will challenge the perceived importance of the medical
foundation of infanticide legislation and, in connection with this, the
relevance of scientific discourse on this topic. I will argue that in order to
provide a fuller understanding of the significance of the medical model of
infanticide it is necessary to place these measures in the historical context in
which they were enacted. I will contend that an exploration of the
background to infanticide laws facilitates a more honest understanding of
this legislation and its scientific basis; by firmly locating these laws in their
broader historical context the true meaning of the medical rationale becomes
evident. This permits us to look beyond a wholly scientific understanding of
the rationale of infanticide laws, and, consequently, to place less reliance on
the views of medical professionals and less emphasis on the validity of
medical definitions in the debate about the future of this legislation.
First, however, I will begin with an overview of the widely recognised
problems with the medical basis of infanticide legislation and the responses
of various law reform bodies and legislatures to these. In brief, a number of
law reform bodies have recommended that this offence/defence be abolished
or amended to reflect contemporary medical thinking on postpartum mental
disturbances. Notably, two jurisdictions, Victoria, Australia, and the
Republic of Ireland, have opted for the latter course of action, recently
both an offence and a defence. The Victorian measure was recently amended, see
infra at n.29. Among the amendments made was an extension of this measure to
cover the killing of infants aged under two years.
" Catherine Damme, "Infanticide: The Worth of an Infant Under Law" (1978) 22
Medical History I, at 24, argues that "the lower status in which the infant was held
by society ... has been institutionalized in English laws on infanticide. .."
12 See generally, Wilczynski, "Mad or Bad? Child Killers, Gender and the Courts"
(1997) 37 Brit. J. Criminol. 419; Morris & Wilczynski, "Rocking the Cradle:
Mothers who Kill their Children" in Birch (ed.), Moving Targets: Women, Murder
and Representation (1993), pp. 198-217; Townsend and Baker, "Infanticide Law -
Primitive and Uncivilised?" (1996) 160 J.P. Rep.655 at 656; New South Wales
Law Reform Commission, Partial Defences to Murder: Provocation and
Infanticide, Report No. 83 (1997), paras.3.31-33 (hereinafter referred to as
NSWLRC, Report 83); Victoria Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide:
Options Paper (2003), paras.6.15-17; Victoria Law Reform Commission,
Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004), para.6.12, (hereinafter referred to as
VLRC, Options Paper; VLRC, Final Report).
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amending their respective infanticide measures to take account of what is
commonly considered to be the prevailing medical consensus on this issue.
In addition, I will briefly examine the evidence in support of the medical
rationale.
Problems with the Medical Model of Infanticide
"Infanticide has been criticised because it is based on the
problematic presumption that women who kill young children
are necessarily mentally disturbed. This presumption does not
take into account the complex factors which can lead to
maternal child killings and does not reflect the range of
circumstances in which children are killed by their mothers."' 
3
There are three mental or mood disturbances associated with the period
following childbirth: the postpartum/postnatal "blues"; postpartum/postnatal
non-psychotic depression; and postpartum/postnatal psychosis. The "blues"
is a mild and transitory mood disorder which affects about fifty to eighty per
cent of all women in the days immediately following childbirth. It includes
symptoms such as tearfulness, despondency, anxiety, confusion, tiredness,
and hostility to the father. This disorder is generally considered to be caused
by sudden and significant fluctuations in hormones after childbirth.'
4
Postnatal depression is a less common but more severe mood disturbance
which is thought to affect about ten per cent of all women after childbirth. Its
symptoms include despondency, anxiety, unusual irritability, and feelings of
inadequacy and an inability to cope with the baby. 5 Postnatal psychosis is a
severe disorder which is thought to affect only one to two out of every
thousand births. The condition generally involves marked disorientation,
confusion, hallucinations and delusions and is characterised by a break with
reality. Postnatal psychosis virtually always requires hospitalisation. 6 Non-
13 VLRC, Final Report, para.6. 1.
14 See literature cited infra, at n. 16.
15 See literature cited infra, at n.16.
16 For a over-view of some of the medical literature on the subject of postpartum
psychiatric disorders, including descriptions of these disorders, their prevalence,
symptoms and features, see generally: Pitt, "Maternity Blues" (1973) 122 British
Journal of Psychiatry 431; Pitt, "'Atypical' Depression Following Childbirth"
(1968) 114 British Journal of Psychiatry 1325; Dean and Kendell, "The
Symtomatology of Puerperal Illnesses" (1981) 139 British Journal of Psychiatry
128; Meltzer and Kumar, "Puerperal Mental Illness, Clinical Features and
Classification: A Study of 142 Mother-and-Baby Admissions" (1985) 147 British
Journal of Psychiatry 647; Kendell, Chalmers & Platz, "Epidemiology of
Puerperal Psychoses" (1987) 150 British Journal of Psychiatry 662; Brockington
and Cox-Roper, "The Nosology of Puerperal Mental Illness" in Kumar and
Brockington (eds.), Motherhood and Mental Illness 2: Causes and Consequences
(1988), pp.1-16; 0' Hara and Zekoski, "Postpartum Depression: A
Comprehensive Review" in Kumar and Brockington (eds.), Motherhood and
Mental Illness 2: Causes and Consequences (1988), pp. 17-63; Boyce and Stubbs,
"The Importance of Postnatal Depression" (1994) 161 The Medical Journal of
Australia 471; Cooper and Murray, "Postnatal Depression" (1998) 316 British
Medical Journal 1884, (hereinafter referred to as Cooper and Murray, "Postnatal
Depression"); Dalton, Depression After Childbirth: How to Recognise, Treat and
Prevent Postnatal Depression (4 'h ed. 2001); Wisner, Gracious, Piontek, Peindl
and Perel, "Postpartum Disorders: Phenomenology, Treatment Approaches and
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psychotic postnatal depression is the disorder most commonly associated
with infanticide; the "blues" do not last for a significant length of time after
childbirth and are not sufficiently severe in nature to be involved in cases of
maternal child killing; puerperal psychosis is an extremely rare condition
which is very seldom involved in cases of child homicide. 7
Infanticide legislation which is based on the English model of 1938 rests the
offence/defence of infanticide on the fact that at the time of the killing the
mother had been suffering from a disturbance in the balance of her mind
which was caused by the effects of childbirth or lactation. However, the
view that women may become mentally disturbed due to the direct biological
effects of childbirth and lactation may be unsubstantiated by modern medical
research. In fact, there appears to be considerable uncertainty about the
exact relationship between childbirth/lactation and mental illnesses. For
example, for some time it seemed to have been accepted that, while a
connection between childbirth and mental disturbance could not be entirely
discounted, the claimed link between breast-feeding and mental imbalance
was untenable." However, recent research suggests that the latter conclusion
Relationship to Infanticide" in Spinelli, (ed.), Infanticide: Psychosocial and Legal
Perspectives on Mothers who Kill (2003), pp.35-60; Spinelli, "Maternal
Infanticide Associated with Mental Illness: Prevention and the Promise of Saved
Lives" (2004) 161 American Journal of Psychiatry 1548 at 1550-1551, hereinafter
referred to as Spinelli, "Maternal Infanticide Associated with Mental Illness:
Prevention and the Promise of Saved Lives". See also McSherry, "The Return of
the Raging Hormones Theory: Premenstrual Syndrome, Postpartum Disorders and
Criminal Responsibility" (1993) 15 SLR 292 at 293-295; VLRC, Final Report,
para.6.32; Wilczynski, Child Homicide, (1997), pp. 155-156, hereinafter referred to
as Wilczynski, Child Homicide.
'7 Wilczynski and Morris, "Parents who Kill their Children" [1993] Crim. L.R. 31 at
35, note that "puerperal psychosis is very rarely the cause of a woman killing her
child". See also NSWLRC, Report 83, para.3.29. Mackay, in a recent study of
infanticide convictions in England and Wales during the period 1990-2003, found,
from an analysis of the psychiatric reports available in the Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) files for these cases, that puerperal psychosis was the primary
diagnosis in 12.2% of the cases he analysed. The most frequent primary diagnosis
in his sample was postnatal depression, which was diagnosed in 28.6% of cases;
see Mackay, "Infanticide and Related Diminished Responsibility Manslaughters:
An Empirical Study", in Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide
(Law Coin No. 304, 2006), pp. 19 2-2 43 at 201, (hereinafter referred to as Mackay,
"Infanticide and Related Diminished Responsibility Manslaughters: An Empirical
Study"). See also Appendix E of this Law Commission report which includes a
table with the classification of the mental disorders associated with infanticide;
Brockington, "Infanticide: Disorders and Classification" in Law Commission,
Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No. 304, 2006), p. 24 4 .
's See generally, the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, Report of the
Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Cmnd 6244, 1975), para.19.23
(hereinafter referred to as the Butler Committee Report); Criminal Law Revision
Committee, Offences against the Person (14th Report, Cmnd 7844, 1980),
paras.103, 105, (hereinafter referred to as CLRC, 141h Report); Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Homicide, (Working Paper 33, 1984), p.76, (hereinafter
referred to as LRCC, Homicide); New South Wales Law Reform Commission,
Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and Infanticide, Discussion Paper No.31
(1993), para.5.16 (hereinafter referred to as NSWLRC, Discussion Paper 31);
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is not necessarily the case; there may indeed be some link between lactation
and mental illness.' 9
It seems that medical experts cannot reach a definite conclusion on these
matters. In an attempt to summarise the bulk of medical research into
postpartum mental illnesses, one can assert that while some medical evidence
supports a biological cause, the general consensus among medical experts
appears to be that postnatal mental disturbances, particularly postnatal
depression,2" are not caused by the profound biological changes, such as
chemical and hormonal imbalances, which accompany childbirth. As has
been noted in relation to theories on a hormonal aetiology for these
conditions, "[t]he results of endocrine research in puerperal mental illness are
not encouraging. Despite a profound feeling that hormones 'have something
to do with it', there are few positive data."
2
'
It seems that the bulk of medical opinion supports an aetiology based on
social and psychological factors, such as poor social support, particularly
poor spousal support, the occurrence of adverse or stressful life events,
including the pregnancy and the birth, and a personal or family history of
mental disorder. 2  Thus, the association between the biological effects of
NSWLRC, Report 83, paras.3.27-3.29; VLRC, Options Paper, paras.6.10-6.14;
VLRC, Final Report, paras.6. 1, 6.32-6.35.
19 See Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Corn No. 304,
2006), para.8.26, (hereinafter referred to as Law Com No. 304), referring to
research conducted by Dr. Maureen Marks; see Marks et al, "Neuroendocrine
Studies in Women at Risk of Post Partum Psychiatric Illness", (forthcoming). The
Law Commission notes that Marks and her colleagues found that "lactation may
increase dopamine sensitivity in some women" which in turn "may trigger
20 psychosis".
It is thought that the postpartum "blues" are caused by biological changes after
childbirth, and there is some research which suggests that postpartum psychosis
does have a biological aetiology. In addition, while there is some research
supporting a biological aetiology for non-psychotic postpartum depression, (i.e.
postnatal depression), the general consensus appears to be that this disorder has a
psychosocial aetiology; see the literature cited supra, at n.16, and infra, at n.22.
21 George and Sandier, "Endocrine and Biochemical Studies in Puerperal Mental
Disorders" in Kumar and Brockington (eds.), Motherhood and Mental Illness 2:
Causes and Consequences (1988), pp. 78 -1 12 at 104.
22 See generally, Cooper and Murray, "Postnatal Depression", p.1885. For some of
the medical literature dealing with the aetiology of postpartum mental disorders
see generally: Paykel, Emms, Fletcher and Rassaby, "Life Events and Social
Support in Puerperal Depression" (1980) 136 British Journal of Psychiatry 339;
Feggetter, Cooper and Gath, "Non-Psychotic Psychiatric Disorders in Women One
Year after Childbirth" (1981) 25 Journal of Psychosomatic Research 369; Watson,
Elliot,. Rugg and Brough, "Psychiatric Disorder in Pregnancy and the First
Postnatal Year" (1984) 144 British Journal of Psychiatry 453; Kumar and Robson,
"Prospective Study of Emotional Disorders in Childbearing Women" (1984) 144
British Journal of Psychiatry 35; O'Hara, "Social Support, Life Events and
Depression during Pregnancy and the Puerperium" (1986) 43 Archives of General
Psychiatry 569; 0' Hara and Zekoski, op. cit., n.16, pp.36-48; Cooper and
Murray, "Course and Recurrence of Postnatal Depression: Evidence for the
Specificity of the Diagnostic Concept" (1995) 166 British Journal of Psychiatry
191; Lane, Keville, Morris, Kinsella, Turner and Barry, "Postnatal Depression and
Elation amongst Mothers and their Partners: Prevalence and Predictors" (1997)
171 British Journal of Psychiatry 550; Steiner, "Postnatal Depression: A Few
510 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol. 58, No. 4]
childbirth and mental disturbance may be only or mainly temporal in nature.
As McSherry notes:
".. . there is very little evidence to show that [postpartum]
disorders stem primarily from hormonal or chemical
imbalances. Most researchers would agree that ... [they] are
associated with multiple factors such as psychological
variables including low motivation for pregnancy and low
level of psychological health, demographic variables such as
socioeconomic status, stress and previous psychiatric and
genetic predispositions. Raging hormones alone cannot be
blamed, but rather, it appears that a combination of external
and perhaps internal stresses may give rise to such
conditions."23
In addition to problems with identifying the precise aetiology of postpartum
mental illnesses, there are also difficulties in determining the diagnostic
status of these conditions. It appears that contemporary medical opinion
doubts whether postnatal mental conditions can be distinguished from mental
disorders which occur at other times in the life cycle. In fact, two major
medical diagnostic systems do not provide for a specific diagnosis of
puerperal mental illness. The American Psychiatric Association in the most
recent edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
(DSM-IV), does not recognise postpartum psychiatric illnesses as separate
disorders with a specific diagnostic status. However, it does provide that a
limited number of diagnoses under this system can be designated as disorders
Simple Questions" (2002) 19 Family Practice 469; Weisner et al, op. cit., n.16,
pp.45-47; Sichel, "Neurohormonal Aspects of Postpartum Depression and
Psychosis" in Spinelli (ed.), Infanticide: Psychosocial and Legal Perspectives on
Mothers who Kill (2003), pp.6 1-79; Spinelli, "Maternal Infanticide Associated
with Mental Illness: Prevention and the Promise of Saved Lives", pp. 1551-1552.
Wilczynski, Child Homicide, p.56, notes some other factors of importance in the
development of postnatal depression such as a "difficult infant temperament,...
the reality of motherhood bearing little relation to the idealised societal view of it,
the expectations made of women to be 'perfect' mothers, and the significant social
and psychological changes frequently accompanying motherhood, such as a loss
of paid employment and feelings of isolation and loss of identity".
23 Op. cit., n.16, p.295. Similarly, the NSWLRC noted: "[it is argued that the
infanticide provisions more often apply to women suffering conditions which
result from the psychological and social stresses of childbirth and child-raising, or
from pre-existing mental conditions. E.g. for a number of women who suffer
depression after giving birth, it may be arguable whether their depression is
aggravated rather than caused by the birth, and may be induced by or equally
attributable to other factors such as marital discord, lack of support or financial
worries"; see NSWLRC, Report 83, para.3.29. The VLRC noted that it is
"problematic for the law to treat infanticide as due to postnatal depression caused
by the act of childbirth or lactation, when in fact the depression may have far more
to do with the pressures of child rearing and be part of the process of adapting to
parenthood"; see VLRC, Options Paper, para.6.13. For further discussion on the
problems with the medical basis of infanticide legislation see generally,
Wilczynski, Child Homicide, pp. 154-159.
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"with postpartum onset" if the illness had an onset within four weeks of
childbirth.24
Similarly, the World Health Organisation's most recent edition of the
International Classification of Diseases, (ICD-10), provides no specific
diagnosis for postpartum mental illnesses. Such disorders are listed in
Chapter Five (Mental and Behavioural Disorders) as "behavioural syndromes
associated with physiological disturbances and physical factors". A
psychiatric disorder can be designated as puerperal once two conditions are
satisfied: the disorder must have commenced within six weeks of childbirth;
and it must not meet the criteria for disorders mentioned elsewhere in that
chapter. 5
The dubious medical basis of infanticide legislation has been noted by
numerous bodies interested in law reform. In some cases, notably in
England, Canada and New South Wales, Australia, it has been suggested that
infanticide be repealed. In those instances where abolition has been
advocated, this has been on the supposition that the defence of diminished
responsibility would be available to mentally disturbed mothers who are
charged with murdering their infants. As yet, not one of these jurisdictions
has abolished its infanticide provisions. 26  Other law reform bodies have
responded to the well acknowledged problems with the medical rationale of
infanticide laws by recommending amendments which would reflect what is
perceived to be the general medical consensus on this issue.27
24 Wisner et al, op. cit., n. 16, p.38; Spinelli, Maternal Infanticide Associated with
Mental Illness: Prevention and the Promise of Saved Lives", p.1551; VLRC, Final
Report, para.6.33, referring to American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000).
25 S.F53 provides for mental and behavioural disorders associated with the
puerperium, not elsewhere classified and this category "includes only mental
disorders associated with the puerperium (commencing within six weeks of
delivery) that do not meet the criteria for disorders classified elsewhere in this
chapter, either because insufficient information is available, or because it is
considered that special additional clinical features are present which make their
classification elsewhere inappropriate". Postnatal and postpartum depressions are
listed as mild mental and behavioural disorders associated with the puerperium,
not elsewhere classified (F53.0). Puerperal psychosis is listed as a severe mental
or behavioural disorder associated with the puerperium. not elsewhere classified
(F53.1). F53.8 provides for "[o]ther mental and behavioural disorders associated
with the puerperium, not elsewhere classified, and F53.9 provides for "[p]uerperal
mental disorder, unspecified"; see, http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ -
accessed 21 April 2005.
26 See generally, the Butler Committee Report, paras.19.22-26; LRCC, Homicide,
p.76; NSWLRC, Report 83, paras.3.18-33.
27 In the late 1970s the CLRC in England and Wales recommended, on the basis of
advice received from the Royal College of Psychiatrists, that the reference to
lactation be dropped from the 1938 Act, and that the definition of infanticide be
widened to embrace the reality that environmental stresses also play a role in
maternal infant killings. It considered that the phrase, "at the time of the act or
omission the balance of the woman's mind was disturbed by reason of the effect
of giving birth or circumstances consequent upon that birth", would serve to
"more accurately reflect the existing practice of the courts"; see CLRC, 1 4 th
Report, para.105, (Italics added). See also CLRC, 14th Report, para. 114, for a
summary of their recommendations with respect to infanticide, including their
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Two jurisdictions have responded to criticisms of infanticide by amending
their respective measures. Victoria recently substituted its existing provisions
on infanticide with a new measure (Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005, section 5)
which, incorporating some of the recommendations made by the Victoria
Law Reform Commission in its recent report, Defences to Homicide,28 drops
the reference to lactation and extends the definition of infanticide to cover
disorders consequent upon childbirth. It also extends this offence/defence to
cover children aged under two years.29 In 2006, the Irish Legislature agreed
to amendments to the Infanticide Act, 1949, which were proposed under the
ambit of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, 2006. The amendments made are
similar to those recommended by the CLRC and the VLRC, and those
adopted by the Victorian parliament:3" the reference to lactation has been
dropped from the 1949 Act and replaced with a reference to a mental
disorder as defined in section 1 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, 2006.31
The Irish infanticide measure now provides for leniency where a mother kills
her infant while the balance of her mind is disturbed by reason of her not
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by
reason of a mental disorder consequent upon the birth of the child. The
proposed definition of that offence. The Law Commission's Draft Criminal Code
for England and Wales adopted this proposed amendment to the definition of
infanticide. S.64 (1) of the Draft Criminal Code provides: "[a] woman who, but
for this section, would be guilty of murder or manslaughter of her child is not
guilty of murder or manslaughter, but is guilty of infanticide, if her act is done
when the child is under the age of twelve months and when the balance of her
mind is disturbed by reason of the effect of giving birth or of circumstances
consequent upon the birth", (italics added); see The Law Commission, A Criminal
Code for England and Wales, Vol. 1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill (Law
Coin No. 177, 1989), s.64. More recently, the VLRC, concluded that despite the
problems with infanticide legislation it was "necessary" to retain a separate
provision "in some form"; see VLRC, Final Report, para.6.22. It recommended
that, in order to reflect the reality of maternal child murder and current medical
thought on postpartum mental illnesses, the reference to lactation should be
dropped from the Victorian measure and that infanticide be extended to embrace
mental disorders consequent upon childbirth; see generally, VLRC, Final Report
paras.6.32-6.35, 6.37 & pp.316-317. Interestingly, the infanticide measure
included in s.178(1) of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, already includes
disorders consequent upon giving birth; see supra at n. 10.28 See supra, at n. 12.
29 S.6(l) of the Crimes Act 1958, as amended by s.5 of the Crimes (Homicide) Act
2005, now provides: "If a woman carries out conduct that causes the death of her
child in circumstances that would constitute murder and, at the time of carrying
out the conduct, the balance of her mind was disturbed because of - (a) her not
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that child within the
preceding 2 years; or (b) a disorder consequent on her giving birth to that child
within the preceding two years - she is guilty of infanticide, and not of murder,
and liable to level 6 imprisonment (5 years maximum)."
30 See supra, at nn.27, 29.
3' See Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, 2006, s.22(a). A mental disorder includes mental
illness, mental disability, dementia or any disease of the mind, but does not
include intoxication; Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, 2006, s.1. It is arguable that
this may be too narrowly defined for the purposes of infanticide. This potential
problem was highlighted by Deputy Costello in Ddil Eireann during the debates on
the Insanity Bill; see Ddil Eireann Parliamentary Debates, vol. 616, cols. 2035,
2040.
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Minister for Justice, Mr. Michael McDowell, explained that his reasons for
this amendment were due to "academic and legal criticism of the perceived
narrow, medical, psychiatric basis for infanticide as set out in the current
law".32 He asserted that he was trying to "remove what is an out of date and
medically unsupportable proposition from the Infanticide Act and to
modernise the language used in that Act to deal adequately with the
phenomenon of mothers who shortly after birth ... injure their children....""
More recently, the Law Commission in England and Wales consulted with a
number of experts in the areas of law and medicine on the subject of
infanticide as part of a wider investigation into the law on homicide in
general. As a result of these consultations the Law Commission concluded
that there "is sufficient medical evidence on which to justify the
offence/defence of infanticide as it stands".34 The Law Commission noted
that while there may be no psychiatric disorders which are "specific to
childbirth", there are still reasons to justify the connection between
parturition and mental disturbances in the legislation.35 It was noted that
there is certainly a temporal connection between childbirth and mental
disorder, the incidence of some disorders being higher in the postpartum
period, and that this suggests that some women are more susceptible to
mental disorder after they give birth.36 With regard to lactation, the Law
Commission pointed to recent research which suggests that the idea that
some women may experience mental imbalances as a result of this biological
process may not be entirely unfounded, as was previously thought.37 The
Law Commission concluded that infanticide should not be extended to
include "circumstances consequent upon childbirth"," and, in light of recent
research suggesting that the supposed link between lactation and mental
disorder is not entirely fallacious, that the reference to lactation in the
legislation should be retained.39
In summary, it is evident that there is little agreement about the causes and
status of post-natal mental disturbances. It seems that mental disturbances
experienced by women in the postpartum period may be attributable to any
number of factors, and that while a biological or physiological explanation
for these disorders cannot be completely discounted,4" the vast majority of
32 ibid., cols. 2034-2035.
33 ibid., col. 2035.
34 Law Com. No. 304, at para.8.25, italics added.
35 ibid.
36 ibid.
37 ibid., at para.8.26, referring to research conducted by Dr. Maureen Marks. See
38 supra, at n. 19.39 ibid., at para.8.31. See supra, at n.27.
4 ibid., at para.8.26.40 E.g. Watson, et al, op. cit., n.22, pp.460-461, although finding that the majority of
episodes of mental disorder among their group of fifteen women who experienced
depression six weeks after childbirth were understood in terms of a previous
psychiatric disorder and/or a reaction to life events, including the stress of the
birth itself (at pp.460-461), two of these women gave no psychosocial explanation
for their illness. A biological explanation was suggested for those two cases, (at
p.461). Paykel et al, op. cit., n.22, pp.344-345, suggested a similar aetiological
foundation for a small subgroup of their sample of 120 women, 20% of whom
were found to have mild clinical depression at six weeks postpartum. Depression
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these instances of mental disturbance seem to arise as a result of external
factors. The bulk of medical research appears to suggest that economic,
social and psychological difficulties are more important than biological
changes at childbirth, and that childbirth as a life event and the stresses and
strains associated with child rearing are more important than the biological
events of childbirth and lactation. The problem widely recognised with
infanticide legislation is that it fails to reflect this reality.
Efforts have been made in a number of jurisdictions, notably in Victoria and
the Republic of Ireland, to respond to this. However, the recent findings of
the Law Commission suggest that any attempt to amend infanticide
legislation to reflect the prevailing views of medical experts may prove to be
unduly hasty. This is particularly pertinent when one considers the lactation
issue. Until very recently it had seemed that there was little or no support for
the theory that breast-feeding could cause mental disturbances, and, in light
of this, it was generally accepted that the reference to lactation should be
dropped from infanticide legislation. However, the findings of the Law
Commission throw some doubt on the prudence of such a course if action.
Certainly, it could be suggested that the decision to drop the reference to
lactation from the Victorian and Irish measures cannot be welcomed without
reservation. However, in defence of the Victorian and Irish legislatures, it
seems that both were influenced by what was considered to be sound medical
opinion. The problem with this is that it appears that medical experts are
unable to reach a definite agreement on the matter of postnatal mental
disturbance. It is suggested, therefore, that it may be unwise to place undue
reliance on their conclusions.
I will argue that, in light of the above difficulties, it may be beneficial to look
beyond the narrow parameters of the medical model to the historical context
in which infanticide legislation was enacted in order to find a suitable means
of rationalising these measures. First, however, it is necessary to briefly note
some of the evidence in favour of the medical model of infanticide.
Support for the Medical Model
While criticisms of the medical basis of infanticide legislation are not
without merit and may present compelling reasons for amending or even
was strongly associated with life events, especially adverse life events. Social
factors such as a poor marital relationship and poor social support were also noted
as vulnerability factors, (at p.344). A previous psychiatric history was also found
to be relevant. In addition, they found that the occurrence of postpartum "blues" in
the early days following childbirth was associated with the presence of postnatal
depression six weeks after the delivery. They noted that since the "blues" was a
"common and time-distinctive phenomenon", it was likely it was "related to
massive hormonal changes". This, in conjunction with the fact that the association
between the "blues" and the later development of postnatal depression occurred
only in the absence of undesirable life events, pointed towards the existence of a
"small hormonal sub-group among the more persistent depressions", especially in
the absence of life stress, (at p.345). Sichel, op. cit., n.22, p.76, concluded, after a
review of much of the recent literature and research on the subject of postpartum
disorders: "[cilearly, the etiology of postpartum mood and psychotic disorders lies
in the biological and physiological elements associated with pregnancy and
childbirth."
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abolishing these measures, the argument in favour of such a course of action
is not necessarily straight-forward. It is important to acknowledge that the
medical basis of the legislation is not entirely bereft of scientific merit.
Thus, although there appears to be much uncertainty among experts about
postpartum mental illnesses, particularly their aetiology and their exact
relationship to childbirth, there seems to be little doubt that women can
suffer from mental disturbances in the postpartum period. Psychiatrists may
argue about the exact causes and suitable classification of postpartum mental
conditions, and their relationship to childbirth, but the fact remains that these
are real disturbances which cause immense mental and emotional upset for
many women.4'
In relation to this, studies indicate that although many women who have been
able to avail of the infanticide legislation have not actually been suffering
from distinct and recognisable disorders such as postpartum depression and
postpartum psychosis, most were not mentally, psychologically and
emotionally stable individuals.42 This is illustrated, for example, in a study
by d'Orban who examined the cases of eighty-nine mothers who had been
admitted to Holloway Prison between 1970 and 1975 on a charge of killing
or attempting to kill a natural child.43 From these offenders, d'Orban
identified six categories of maternal child killing: battering mothers (thirty-
six cases); mentally ill mothers (twenty-four cases); neonaticides (eleven
cases); retaliating mothers (nine cases); mothers who killed unwanted
children (eight cases); and mercy killing (one case). From the eighty-nine
cases examined a total of twenty-three women were convicted of infanticide.
Although only two offenders fell into what d'Orban identified as the
mentally ill group of mothers,' it seems that many, though not all, of the
41 See Lansdowne, "Infanticide: Psychiatrists and the Plea Bargaining Process"
(1990) 16 MonLR 41 at 62. McSherry, op. cit., n.16, p.293, notes that there "is
now little doubt about the existence of postpartum depression and postpartum
psychosis". See also, VLRC, Final Report, paras.6.32-6.34.
42 E.g. see generally, D'Orban, "Women who Kill their Children" (1979) 134 British
Journal of Psychiatry 560; Lansdowne, ibid., Mackay, "Infanticide and Related
Diminished Responsibility Manslaughters: An Empirical Study".
4i See D'Orban, op. cit., n.42. This study was not restricted to cases involving the
killing of infants aged under one year.
44 ibid. p.566, Table V. Of the twenty-three women who were convicted of
infanticide, ten fell into the battering category; ten fell into the category of
neonaticide; two fell into the mentally ill category; and one fell into the retaliating
category. The group of mentally ill mothers included "all cases suffering from
psychotic illness, cases of acute reactive depression associated with a suicidal
attempt and cases of personality disorder with depressive symptoms of sufficient
severity to require admission to psychiatric hospital and who did not meet the
criteria of the other categories". Two-thirds of the victims in this category were
aged over one year. In only half of the cases involving psychotic women did the
illness occur in the puerperium. D'Orban concludes that "contrary to medico-legal
tradition these filicides are not especially associated with the puerperium, when
women are thought to be particularly liable to kill their children" (at pp.569-570).
Marks and Kumar, in a re-analysis of d'Orban's data, found that the killing of
older children was more associated with mental illness than the killing of young
infants. Women who killed their children aged under six months were more likely
to do so due to a loss of temper, i.e. in the context of fatal child abuse/battering.
Mothers who killed older children were "most frequently categorized as mentally
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other women convicted of infanticide were suffering from a mental,
psychological or emotional disturbance, albeit of a less serious nature.45
Maier-Katkin and Ogle opine, after considering the medical evidence on
puerperal mental disorders, including d'Orban's study, that "[o]n balance, it
seems inappropriate to dismiss the link between childbirth and mental illness
as a myth created by the authors of the Infanticide Act."'46 They note that
while d'Orban classified only twenty-four of the eighty-nine cases he
examined as being "mentally ill", the majority of women in his study did
satisfy the requirement in the 1938 statute of a disturbance in the balance of
the mind.47 As Maier-Katkin and Ogle note, the 1938 Act does not expect a
psychotic or severe mental illness to be shown; it only requires some
disturbance in the balance of the mind.48 They conclude that "even if most of
the women who kill their own children do not suffer from psychoses or other
extreme mental illnesses, many do; and the others probably suffer from the
types of emotional distress contemplated by the statute." '49
A more recent study by Mackay also indicates that women who have availed
of infanticide in the past have not been mentally and/or emotionally stable
individuals. Mackay examined a sample of forty-nine infanticide convictions
in England and Wales from 1990 to 2003.0 Using the information contained
in the Crown Prosecution Services files," in particular the psychiatric reports
ill". They conclude: "[it would appear that while maternal mental illness has
contributed to many of the younger infant homicides, more often infants had been
killed, or nearly killed, because the mother had suddenly lost her temper with
them"; see Marks, "Characteristics and Causes of Infanticide in Britain" (1996) 8
International Review of Psychiatry 99 at 104-105, referring to Marks and Kumar,
"Parents who Kill their Infants" (1995) 3 British Journal of Midwifery 249.
4s Overall seventy-five (84%) of the eighty-nine women in the study were diagnosed
with some kind of psychiatric abnormality. The diagnoses were as follows:
personality disorder (43%); reactive depression (21%); psychotic illness (16%);
subnormal (4%); no abnormality (16%); see op. cit., n.42, p.562, Table 11. Thirty-
two of the thirty-six mothers who fell into the battering category were suffering
from some psychiatric abnormality (at p.562). Fifteen of the cases in the battering
group involved the killing of an infant aged under one year and ten of these cases
resulted in an infanticide conviction, (at p.566). One woman from the retaliating
group was convicted of infanticide, ibid., p.566, Table V. All of the women in this
category had been diagnosed with some abnormality, either a personality disorder
(eight) or reactive depression (one) (at p.562) Table 11. There was a lower
incidence of diagnosed psychiatric abnormality among the group of neonaticidal
women; eight of the eleven women who killed their infants within twenty-four
hours of birth had no psychiatric abnormality, (at p.562). Two women were
diagnosed with a personality disorder and one woman was diagnosed as being
subnormal. In spite of this, ten of these mothers were convicted of infanticide. The
infant of the one woman from this group who was not convicted of infanticide had
survived, (at p.566).




50 See Mackay, "Infanticide and Related Diminished Responsibility Manslaughters:
An Empirical Study".
51 In eleven cases these files could not be accessed and the psychiatric reports were,
therefore, not available for consultation; see ibid., p.201.
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which were available,52 Mackay distilled data on the type of diagnoses made
in cases of infanticide during this period. In 22.4 per cent of cases (eleven in
number), no information was available. In the remaining cases, the most
frequent primary diagnosis53 was postnatal depression (28.6 per cent,
fourteen cases). In seven cases a diagnosis of depression was given (14.3 per
cent of the total number of cases examined). The next most frequent
diagnosis was puerperal psychosis, which was made in 12.2 per cent of the
forty-nine cases analysed. In the remaining eleven cases for which Mackay
had access to psychiatric reports, the diagnoses were as follows: dissociative
disorder five cases (10.2 per cent); mental disturbance four cases (8.2 per
cent); abnormality of mind one case (2 per cent); and personality disorder
one case (2 per cent).54 In addition, forty-three of the sixty-seven available
reports (64.2 per cent) referred to the issue of infanticide and favoured this
disposal.55 This study indicates that, despite theoretical problems with the
existence, causes and status of postnatal mental illnesses, and the connected
dubious foundation of infanticide legislation, in practice, psychiatrists seem
to have had little difficulty in ascribing some kind of abnormal mental
condition to women who have availed of infanticide, and, in the majority of
cases, have been willing to tie this in with the relevant legislative provisions.
Therefore, it is arguable that the medical basis of infanticide legislation must
have some merit, if not on a theoretical level, then at least on a practical one.
It is also important to emphasise that the medical foundation of the
infanticide legislation should not be viewed restrictively. The background to
the enactment of the 1922 and 1938 Acts and the language used in these
measures suggest that a recognised disease or a disorder should not
necessarily be required in order for infanticide to be established. It is evident
from the circumstances in which this legislation was adopted in England and
in Ireland that the legislature had no intention of restricting infanticide to
situations where mothers killed their infants while labouring under severe
and definable mental illnesses, such as depression or psychosis. It is more
likely that the legislature was concerned with mental distresses or upsets
caused by the exhausting and frightening experience of childbirth or the
strains associated with the lactational period. The language chosen, "a
disturbance in the balance of the mind", appears to reflect this; it can and
evidently has been construed as requiring something much less than a mental
disease, disorder or abnormality caused by the physical effects of childbirth
52 Each file contained between one and four psychiatric reports. In some cases it was
evident that other reports had been available at the time but were not included in
the CPS File. Mackay notes that the fact that these files did not include all relevant
reports should be borne in mind when considering his analysis of the psychiatric
evidence available in these cases; see ibid.
53 This was based on the cumulative view of the reports available in each case: see
ibid., p.201 at n.8.
54 See ibid., pp.201-202.
55 ibid., p.203. In twenty-three reports no reference was made to infanticide. The
author of the remaining report found that the woman's mental condition was a
disturbance of mind within the 1938 Act, but left it to the court to decide whether
this description was correct.
518 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol. 58, No. 4]
or lactation.56 For example, D'Orban concluded from his study that the
disturbance required by the Infanticide Act 1938:
"... is clearly not interpreted by medical witnesses and by the
courts as a severe abnormality amounting to psychiatric
disorder; the degree of abnormality is much less than that
required to substantiate 'abnormality of mind' amounting to
substantially diminished responsibility under section 2 of the
Homicide Act 1957."57
56 It seems evident from numerous studies that infanticide laws have not been
applied in a restrictive manner, requiring the establishment of disorders such as
psychosis and depression. In fact, in the right circumstances, that is those calling
for an avoidance of a murder trial and a discretionary sentence, a mild and
temporary mental disturbance caused by fear, panic, exhaustion, frustration and
stress, all of which may be associated with childbirth and child rearing, have
sufficed. E.g. see generally: Morris & Wilczynski, op. cit., n.12; Lansdowne, op.
cit., n.41; Mackay, "The Consequences of Killing Very Young Children" [19931
Crim. L.R. 21, (hereinafter referred to as Mackay, "The Consequences of Killing
Very Young Children"). For an examination of the operation of the Irish
infanticide measure see Brennan, Infanticide Past and Present: Law, History and
Culture (PhD Thesis, University College Dublin, 2006), chap. 10.
" See op. cit., n.42, p.570. If this is the case, it may cause difficulties with the new
definition of infanticide in Ireland which includes a mental disorder consequent
upon childbirth. As already noted, the term mental disorder is also used in the
Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, 2006, in connection with the defences of insanity
and diminished responsibility. D'Orban's finding is relevant in relation to the
recommendations of the Butler Committee to abolish the Infanticide Act in
England on the basis that it can be adequately dealt with by the defence of
diminished responsibility; see the Butler Committee Report paras.19.22-19.26.
However, it is of interest to note that in Mackay's most recent study of infanticide,
(supra, text at nn.50-55), 38.9% (twenty-six in number) of the psychiatric reports
available on women who were dealt with under the 1938 Infanticide Act between
1990 and 2003 favoured diminished responsibility "rather than or as an alternative
to" infanticide. In addition, only two (3%) of the sixty-seven available reports
concluded that the woman's condition did not fall within the diminished
responsibility provisions in s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957. Mackay notes that this
is "of interest in view of earlier concerns expressed ...that not all cases of
infanticide would fall within section 2 as the requirements contained in the latter
are stricter and more difficult to satisfy"; see "Infanticide and Related Diminished
Responsibility Manslaughters: An Empirical Study", pp.205. These findings do
cast some doubt on d'Orban's conclusion. However, it is worth noting, as Mackay
does, that thirty-nine of the reports he examined (58. 1%) did not mention the issue
of diminished responsibility. It is not possible to know what the relevant author
would have concluded had he/she addressed the issue in his/her report, but, as
Mackay notes, one cannot be sure that, had he/she addressed the issue, he/she
"might not have regarded D's condition as satisfying the section 2 criteria", (at
p.206). In an earlier study of infanticide cases in England during the 1980s,
Mackay concluded that "the criteria within the 1938 Act were being used
primarily as a legal device for avoiding the mandatory penalty and thus ensure that
leniency could be shown in appropriate cases"; see Mackay, "The Consequences
of Killing Very Young Children", p.29. See also, Cheung, "Maternal Filicide in
Hong Kong" (1986) 26 Med. Sci. Law 185. Cheung reached a similar conclusion
to d'Orban's in his study of thirty-five maternal filicides in Hong Kong between
1971 and May 1985. Using the same classification system as d'Orban, Cheung
found that only six of the thirteen women in his study who were convicted of
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Thus, in summary, there are arguments in favour of the medical basis of
infanticide legislation. First, in spite of the difficulties with classification
and aetiology, postpartum mental disturbances are not necessarily fictitious
illnesses; there is little doubt that many women do suffer from mental upsets
in the period after childbirth. Second, it seems that infanticide legislation
does work well in practice.
However, due to the problems which beset the medical basis of infanticide,
more may be required to justify these measures in their current form. I
suggest that the historical background to this legislation provides a broader
perspective on the meaning of the medical model of infanticide and on the
purpose of these measures; by placing infanticide legislation in its historical
context, the actual significance of the medical basis of these measures should
become evident and the real justification for the infanticide statutes will
emerge. In the following section I will examine the background to the
enactment of the English and Irish Infanticide Acts. In doing so, I will seek
to provide a re-evaluation of the relevance of the medical basis of infanticide
legislation and, consequently, the importance of medical discourse on this
topic.
Locating Scientific Paternalism: The Background to Infanticide
Legislation in These Islands
The English Experience
The Infanticide Acts 1922 and 1938 were introduced in England and Wales
in response to the long recognised problems with the law of murder in the
context of maternal infant killing. For many years it had been accepted that
the law in this area was in need of alteration. The mandatory sentence of
death in all cases of murder posed significant problems in cases where
women were charged with murdering their infants. In England and Wales no
woman had been executed for the murder of her child since 1849, and judges
had long bemoaned the prevailing practice in cases where women were
convicted of murdering their own infants whereby they were expected to don
the black-cap and in all solemnity pass a sentence of death which everyone
knew would be reprieved.
As far back as the mid-nineteenth century this particular difficulty with the
law relating to maternal infant murder had been highlighted.5" A number of
infanticide (Offences Against the Person Ordinance, s.47C) could be classified as
falling into the mentally ill group. The remaining seven women "did not suffer
from any abnormality which could be described as mental disorder", (at p.191;
p.189, Table VII). He similarly concluded that "the degree of abnormality in these
cases was much less than that required to meet the definition of 'abnormality of
mind' amounting to diminished responsibility" in Hong Kong, (s.3 of the
Homicide Ordinance which was the equivalent to s.2 of the English Homicide Act
1957), (at p.191).
58 This was not the only problem with the law relating to infant murder in the
nineteenth century. In cases where persons where charged with the murder of
newborn infants the prosecution had, due to the presumption of dead birth, the
difficult task of proving that the murdered child had been fully born alive at the
time of death. This meant that any child that had not been fully born alive at the
time of death was afforded no protection under the criminal law. Thus, many
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witnesses before the 1866 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 9
referred to this problem which had been termed the "solemn mockery" or
"black-cap farce". For example, the then Home Secretary, Sir Grey Bart,
noted that between 1849 and the end of 1864 there had been thirty-nine
convictions for maternal child murder, or infanticide as it was then
commonly called.6' He observed that since the last execution for infanticide
in 1849, there had been five Secretaries of State, all of whom had commuted
the death sentences imposed in these cases: "[t]he rule has now been adopted
of commuting the [death] sentence, but I think that it is almost invariably
done upon the recommendation of the judge, or in concurrence with him."61
The Rev. Lord S. G. Osborne remarked that "[i]n nine cases out often, trying
women for their lives for infanticide is a cruel farce" because "no one for one
moment believes that the woman will be executed."6 2
The problem of the "solemn mockery" reflected the pity which was almost
invariably felt for women who murdered their young infants. Infanticide was,
during a period where women committed few offences, typically a female
crime. Similar to the prostitute and female poisoner, the mother who
murdered her infant was "a negation of the ideal of womanhood".63 In spite
of this, due to the social context in which she committed her crime, the
infanticidal mother tended to attract a great deal of sympathy from jurors,
judges and others who were involved in her murder trial. Throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and indeed well into the twentieth
century, infanticide and illegitimacy were commonly linked, the latter
frequently providing a compelling motive for the former.64 The typical
persons who killed infants in the act of birth or before the child had been fully
born alive escaped conviction for murder or manslaughter. Many mothers who
killed their infants before they were fully born alive were convicted of the lesser
offence of concealment of birth. In 1929, the Infant Life Preservation Act was
enacted to close this loophole in the law; see generally Seaborne Davies, "Child
killing in English Law" in Radzinowicz and Turner (eds.), Modern Approach to
Criminal Law (1945), pp.301-343 at 303-310; Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law
(5th ed. 1911), pp.128-129; Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law(1958), pp.19-23; Atkinson, "Life, Birth and Live-Birth" (1904) 20 L.Q.R. 134-
159. See also Casey, Born Alive: The Legal Status of the Unborn Child in England
and the U.S.A. (2005), pp.12-19, who provides an historical account of the born
alive rule.
'9 B.P.P, 1866, xxi. The page numbers noted for the B.P.P.'s refer to the page
number of the whole volume, rather than the page number of the individual paper,
report, document etc.




63 Emsley, Crime and Society in England 1750-1900 (2nd ed. 1996), p. 156.
64 For an account of child murder during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
see generally, Rose, Massacre of the Innocents: Infanticide in Britain 1800-1939
(1986). See also, Sauer, "Infanticide and Abortion in Nineteenth Century Britain"
32 Population Studies 81; Higginbotham, "'Sin of the Age': Infanticide and
Illegitimacy in Victorian London" (1989) Victorian Studies 319. By the latter half
of the nineteenth century infanticide seems to have provoked a certain amount of
hysteria in the public domain and tended to be strongly associated with poverty
and illegitimacy. One must be careful, however, not to assume that illegitimacy
Beyond the Medical Model: A Rationale for Infanticide.... 521
infanticide offender was an unmarried mother, who, having much to lose by
giving birth to an infant outside the bonds of wedlock, concealed the
pregnancy and birth, killing her infant shortly thereafter.65 The unmarried
mother, or "fallen woman", by demonstrating disregard for the Victorian
sexual code,66 and, in particular, the revered ideal of female chastity could
face social and economic ruin;6 the consequences of illegitimacy were
especially serious for domestic servants who relied on their respectability to
gain and maintain employment, and infanticide was particularly associated
with this occupational class.68
In addition, women were often left to deal with the results of their sexual
encounters alone; the sexual double standards of the time ensured that men
generally emerged unscathed from their pre-marital or extra-marital sexual
encounters, something which was both demonstrated and reinforced by the
automatically led to infanticide. Many women faced the daunting prospect of
giving birth to a child outside of marriage, but only a few resorted to murder as a
means of dealing with this. As Higginbotham notes, .. . .melodramatic claims
about the extent of child murder overemphasised the actions of a few women and
ignored the special circumstances surrounding most cases of infanticide", (at
p.337). For a contemporary account of the problem of infanticide, see generally,
Burke, Infanticide: Its Law, Prevalence, Prevention and History (1862).
65 Rose notes that upper-class women who became pregnant as a result of some
sexual indiscretion had more options available due to the protection offered to
them by their class and wealth; see Rose, op. cit., n.64, p.20.
66 For accounts of nineteenth century Britain's social history, and particularly
Victorian views on sexual morality, see generally: Seaman. Victorian England:
Aspects of English and Imperial History 1837-1901 (1973), pp.6-14; Rubinstein,
Britain's Century: A Political and Social History 1815-1905 (1998), pp.325-326,
331-332: L'Esperance, "Doctors and Women in Nineteenth Century Society:
Sexuality and Role" in Woodward and Richards (eds.), Health Care and Popular
Medicine in Nineteenth Century England (1977), pp. 105-127 at 106.
67 See L'Esperance, ibid., p. 106; Seaman, ibid., pp. 13-14; Smout, "Aspects of Sexual
Behavior in Nineteenth Century Scotland" in Laslett, Oosterveen & Smith (eds.),
Bastardy and its Comparative History: Studies in the History of Illegitimacy and
Marital Nonconformity in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, North America,
Jamaica and Japan ( 1980), pp. 19 2-2 16 at 193-196. Incidentally, there were parts
of rural Britain, particularly in Scotland and Wales, where illegitimacy posed no
problem. Local customs, rather than frowning upon premarital sexual relations,
actually encouraged them as part of a healthy courtship which would inevitably
end in marriage. If a pregnancy resulted, stem community values ensured marriage
in the vast majority of cases, while the occasional seduced and abandoned female
generally avoided community censure and found it safe and acceptable to raise her
child alone with family support; see generally, Smout, ibid., pp.192-216,
particularly pp.206-207; Ireland, "'Perhaps My Mother Murdered Me': Child
Death and the Law of Victorian Carmarthenshire" in Brooks and Lobban. (eds.),
Communities and Courts in Britain 1150-1900 (1997)., pp.2 29 -24 4 at 242-243.
Similarly, Rose, op. cit., n.64., pp.20-21, notes that loss of virtue did not
necessarily result in irreparable damage to a working-class woman's social
standing; the economic consequences of illegitimacy were more significant to
these women than any social stigma which might attach.
68 See Rose, op. cit., n.64, pp.19-20, who notes the particular vulnerability of
domestic servants. Smout, notes that if a domestic servant became pregnant she
would almost certainly be dismissed without a reference, thus becoming
unemployable, and this is why so many of Edinburgh's prostitutes had been
domestic servants; Smout, op. cit., n.67, p. 196.
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bastardy clauses in contemporary poor laws.69 Perhaps, then, it is not
surprising that mothers who murdered their infants were met with some
compassion by the men whose duty it was to administer justice. Faced with a
woman who committed what was perceived to be the most unnatural of
crimes, but who portrayed the stereotypical image of abandonment, isolation,
fear, poverty, ignorance and shame, the male juror or judge could hardly fail
to respond with some pity, particularly if he, due to his sex and class, felt
some form of collective responsibility for the situation in which the accused
woman found herself. This is reflected in the words of the Rev. Lord
Osborne in his evidence before the Commission on Capital Punishment,
where he stated: "mankind generally are so far conscience stricken in this
matter that they feel a very natural reluctance to visit on the woman the full
penalty of a crime in which themselves have antecedently much to answer
for.
70
The abhorrence of the death penalty as a punishment in cases of maternal
infant murder resulted in two problems. First, juries were extremely reluctant
to convict mothers who killed their infants of the capital offence of murder.
Although they were generally aware that this sentence would not be carried
out, this being the established practice in cases of this kind since 1849, they
were equally reluctant to put the "poor woman", who may not have been
wise to this arrangement and who may have fully believed that the sentence
would be carried into effect, through the torment of having this sentence
declared in open court.7' Essentially, the severity of the law prevented these
offenders from being effectively brought to justice.72
69 See generally, Henriques, "Bastardy and the New Poor Law" 37 (1967) Past and
Present 103; Rose, op. cit., n.64, chap.4.
70 B.P.P., 1866, vol. xxi, p.476. Mothers who murdered their infants may also have
been treated more leniently than other intentional killers due to nineteenth century
views on the value of infant life and, in connection with this, the seriousness of
infant murder. Infant life seems to have been held cheap during this period,
probably due to the high infant mortality rate from causes such as poverty, disease
and a failure to educate mothers on infant health. Certainly, at least in the earlier
part of this century, the common occurrence of infanticide may not have been
regarded with any particular alarm, this crime being viewed as less heinous than
murder; see generally, Rose, op. cit., n.64, pp.35-36; Sauer, op. cit., n.64, pp.82-
83. The comments of some of the witnesses called before the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment, reflects this view of infanticide as a crime which was less
serious than murder; see, B.P.P., 1866, xxi, pp.57 (Lord Cranworth), pp.109-110
(the Right Honorable S. H. Walpole, M. P.), p.34 3 (James Fitzjames Stephens).
During the latter part of this century, however, there appears to have been a
growing concern with infant welfare and protection, particularly among the
medical profession, and with the problem of infanticide; see generally, Rose, op.
cit., n.64, chap.5; Sauer, op. cit., n.64, p.85; Higginbotham, op. cit., n.64, p.320.
71 For a good description of this problem see the words of Lord Arnold, loc. cit.
n.108, in the parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of the 1938
Infanticide Act. Although he was referring to the problems with the 1922
legislation, his comments are relevant to the difficulties with the law pre-1922; the
"black-cap farce" continued to be the main problem with the law post-1922 due to
the narrow ambit of the first Infanticide Act which confined itself to the murder of
"newly-born" infants.
72 See generally, Seaborne Davies, op. cit., n.58; Higginbotham, op. cit., n.64; Rose,
op. cir., n.64, chap.8; Ireland, op. cit., n.67. See also the evidence of those
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Second, members of the judiciary appeared disgruntled about this
arrangement whereby they would don the black cap and declare most
solemnly that the convicted woman would be executed for her crime,
knowing that it would very shortly be commuted by the Home Secretary,
usually at their own request and that of the jury."5 As Lord Coleridge noted
in the debate surrounding a proposed infanticide clause in the Children's Act
of 1908: "[w]hoever had passed through the experience of passing such a
sentence knew well that he had discharged a very grave function indeed, and
to deprive that function of its solemnity was to deprive it of its reality as well
as of its efficacy as a warning."74
The solution to these problems, which was contained in the 1922 Infanticide
Act, was to medicalise the crime of maternal infant murder by providing for
lenient treatment on the basis that the balance of the mother's mind was
disturbed at the time of the killing. The Infanticide Act 1922 created the
offence/defence of infanticide, which would be akin to manslaughter for the
purposes of trial and punishment. A woman could be charged with or
convicted of infanticide if she "by any wilful act or omission cause[d] the
death of her newly-born child" in circumstances amounting to murder while
"the balance of her mind was ... disturbed" due to the fact that she had "not
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child". 5
These provisions were subsequently extended by the Infanticide Act 1938 to
cover the killings of infants up to the age of one year. This was a response to
the construction which had been given to the term "newly-born" by the
courts; this term had been interpreted narrowly to embrace infants aged up to
three or four weeks only.76 This had resulted in similar problems to those
which had existed prior to the enactment of the 1922 legislation; judges were
again solemnly declaring sentences of death on mothers who had been
convicted of killing their infants in cases where everyone knew this sentence
would inevitably be reprieved. In order to accommodate this extension of the
infanticide provisions to mothers who killed their infants up to the age of
twelve months, the 1938 Act incorporated a reference to a disturbance in the
witnesses who appeared before the 1866 Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment; B.P.P., 1866, xxi.
73 See literature cited supra, at n.72. This has not been the only time in the history of
criminal justice where the full rigor of the law was avoided in this way. E.g.
during the latter half of the eighteenth century, despite the increase in capital
property offences and convictions, the number of executions which were actually
carried into effect remained fairly stable; the use of royal pardons ensured that
many of those sentenced to death for property offences were not hanged, but were
transported or imprisoned. Similar to the problem with infanticide in the
nineteenth century, law reformers asserted that the "policy of terror"' was
ineffective and argued in favour of "more lenient but more certain punishments";
see generally, Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in Hay et al (eds.)
Albions's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteen Century England (1975).
pp.17-64, especially pp.22-23. As Hay notes, "...rather than terrifying criminals,
the death penalty terrified prosecutors and juries, who feared committing judicial
murder on the capital statutes", (at p.2 3 ).
74 Parliamentary Debates (H.L.), 1908, vol. 196, col. 490.
75 See Infanticide Act 1922, s. I(]) & (2).
76 See R. v Donoghue (1927) 20 Cr. App. R. 132; R. v Hale, The Times, 2 2nd July
1936. p. 13 .
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balance of the mind caused by the effects of lactation. The English and
Welsh infanticide legislation now provided for leniency where a mother
killed her infant aged under twelve months while the balance of her mind was
disturbed from the effects of childbirth or lactation. " The Infanticide Act
1938 has not since been amended. It has provided the model for infanticide
legislation adopted in a number of jurisdictions, including the Republic of
Ireland. 8
The Irish Experience
Infanticide legislation was introduced in the Republic of Ireland in 1949.
The background to this measure can be gleaned from the letters and
memoranda contained in files of the Department of Justice, Department of
the Taoiseach and the Attorney General's Office which are held in the
National Archives in Dublin. The documents contained in these files provide
a wealth of information on the origins of this measure, including the
perceived reasons for the need to review the law on maternal child murder in
that jurisdiction.7 9 It is evident from these sources that, as in England and
Wales, the main problem was that the law, which mandated a sentence of
death in all murder cases, was considered to be too harsh where women
killed their young infants in circumstances which demanded sympathy rather
than severity.
As in England, the pervading view was that mothers who murdered their
infants were generally "more sinned against than sinning". The vast majority
of women who killed their infants were unmarried and they killed to avoid
the shame, scandal, stigmatisation, isolation and economic hardship which
illegitimacy attracted. Many girls and women who found that they were
pregnant with a child conceived during an "illicit" sexual union concealed
their pregnancies from their families and communities in order to avoid the
dire social and economic consequences of this. Undoubtedly, many women
who disguised their pregnancies and gave birth behind a veil of secrecy did
not subsequently kill their infants. However, where death did occur, it was
usually a result of or a continuation of this concealment: some infants died
due to their mother's ignorance or neglect during the course of or in the
aftermath of an unassisted birth; others were deliberately killed soon after
77 See Infanticide Act 1938, s.I(I) & (2).
78 S.I(I) of the Infanticide Act 1938 defines the offence of infanticide as follows:
"[w]here a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child
being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission
the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered
from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation
consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the
circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted to
murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such
offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of
manslaughter of the child."
79 See generally, National Archives Dublin: Department of Justice files (infanticide)
8/144/I: 8/144/A; H266/61; Department of Taoiseach files s14493 (infanticide),
s. 13311 (insanity) & s.7788(a) (capital punishment); Attorney General Office files
(infanticide) 2000/10/2921 & 2922.
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birth by their mothers who were desperate to conceal the fact that they had
ever existed."0
It is also possible that an acceptance of reduced responsibility in cases of
maternal infant murder was supported by common lay perceptions about the
physical and mental effects of childbirth on women. It may have been
assumed that many mothers who killed their infants around the time of
parturition did so at a moment of great physical and mental weakness and, in
some cases, mental disturbance. Such a popular belief in mental weakness
and instability is illustrated in the trial judge's charge to the jury at the trial
of a County Monaghan woman who had been charged with murdering her
newborn infant by strangling it with a rope."' The accused in this case, a
thirty-four year old married woman who became pregnant as a result of an
extra-marital affair, claimed that after she had given birth alone in a barn in
the middle of the night, she had fainted twice and could not remember much
of the events thereafter. She emphasised that she was in great pain and that
she did not know what she was doing. She did concede, however, that
although she did not remember tying a rope around the neck of her newborn
infant, she may have done so. Hanna J. told the jury at the Central Criminal
Court that if they were of the opinion that the defendant had "lost complete
control of herself' so as not to have committed her act "in a premeditated
way but in a state of sudden feeling or emotion which diverted her sense of
judgment" that they could bring in a verdict of manslaughter. In relation to
the issue of childbirth and the possible effects of this experience on a
woman, and on the accused in this particular case, he stated:
"[n]ow everyone knows ... that the bringing of a child into the
world is accompanied very often - usually it is - with great
pain and suffering to the woman. Some of them become
demented by it - some of them are not so upset .... Well now,
Gentlemen even if [the defendant] is exaggerating these pains
she must have been in a rather distressed condition - I mean -
one would infer naturally she would not be as vigorous in her
mind and soul as if going about in the ordinary way. The crisis
must have naturally affected her mentally and physically."82
This indicates that some judges were willing to utilise common conceptions
about the travails of childbirth and the near madness this may entail to
encourage verdicts of manslaughter. 3
80 See generally, Brennan, op. cit., n.56, pp.232-241 & Appendix 1.
81 For the details of this case see the Court of Criminal Appeal file; National
Archives Dublin: CCA 1934/3 1.
82 See Judge's Charge to the Jury in the transcript for the trial; National Archives
Dublin, CCA 1934/31.
83 Mrs. C was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to
three years penal servitude. She successfully appealed this conviction and at a
retrial was found "not guilty". See National Archives Dublin: CCA 1934/31. See
also, National Archives Dublin: State Book at Central Criminal Court, November
1933 - April 1941, ID-11-92; Attorney General v B.C.C., indictment no. I,
Central Criminal Court, Co. Monaghan, II June 1934 (trial); indictment no. i,
Central Criminal Court, Co. Monaghan, 19 November 1934 (retrial).
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The response of those involved in the determination of justice in cases where
mothers were suspected of murdering their infants was to persistently avoid
the death penalty. A situation had evolved, similar to that in England, where
for years no woman had been hanged for the murder of her infant child."
This was achieved in a variety of ways: pleas of guilty to lesser offences
such as manslaughter and concealment of birth 5 were accepted in many
cases, even where there was more than cogent evidence of murder; in cases
where a murder charge was pursued at the Central Criminal Court, juries
shied from convicting mothers of this offence, relying, instead, on acquittals
or convictions for lesser offences, or, less frequently, verdicts of insanity;
and, in cases where the jury did convict for murder, the mandatory sentence
of death was commuted, usually on the recommendation of both the jury and
trial judge.86  Essentially, the abhorrence of the death penalty as a
punishment for women who were convicted of murdering their infants had
rendered the law on maternal infant murder both ridiculous and ineffective.
The main problems with the law which were noted were the "tragic farce"
involved in putting a woman through the "ordeal" of a murder trial and
conviction, and the "grim spectacle" of a death sentence when everybody
knew that this sentence would be reprieved, and, in connection with this, the
"futility" of arraigning young girls for the murder of their infants when the
killing took place shortly after birth.87
These problems were illustrated by figures presented in 1941 on the
prosecution of child murderers in the Central Criminal Court. In 1937, eight
persons were indicted for the murder of infant children: one of these was
found insane; two pleaded guilty to concealment of birth; and five pleaded
guilty to manslaughter. In 1938, there were seven such cases: one was found
insane; one was convicted of murder; one was acquitted of murder; and four
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In 1939, there were four cases: one was tried
for murder and acquitted; two pleaded guilty to manslaughter; and one
84 See National Archives Dublin: Department of Taoiseach files s14493 & s13311,
Department of Justice memorandum dealing with the proposed legislation to
amend the law on insanity and infanticide, dated 4 th January 1944. See also, an
updated version of this Department of Justice memorandum, dated 10 th February,
1949; National Archives Dublin: Department of Taoiseach file s14493 &
Department of Justice file 8/144/1.
85 See Offences against the Person Act 1861, s.60.
86 See two "Returns of Persons Sentenced to Death" in National Archives Dublin:
Department of Taoiseach file s.7788(a). These Returns provide some information
on cases where women where convicted of murdering their infants and
subsequently sentenced to death between 1922 and 1937. The Returns, dated
1922-32 and 1932-37, include nine cases where women were convicted of the
murder of their newly or recently born infants. In every case the jury
recommended mercy and the trial judge agreed, sometimes adding his reasons for
this. Every woman convicted had the mandatory sentence of death sentence that
had been imposed on her commuted to penal servitude for life. In one case, the
mother's younger sister, who was also convicted of murder, similarly had her
death sentence reprieved on the recommendation of both the jury and trial judge.
Many of these women were given early releases, with or without conditions, and,
therefore, served only a couple of years of their life sentences.
87 For a more detailed exploration of the problems with the law, see generally,
sources noted supra, at n.79, in particular the memoranda noted supra, at n.84. See
also, Brennan, op. cit., n.56, pp.241-248.
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pleaded guilty to concealment of birth. In 1940, six cases of child murder
came before the Central Criminal Court: one defendant was acquitted of
murder; the other five pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In the
January/February sitting of the Central Criminal Court for 1941, two persons
pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of infants. There were two cases of child
murder pending in the next session. So, of the twenty-seven cases of child
murder dealt with by the Central Criminal Court between 1937 and February
of 1941, only one resulted in a conviction. The reluctance of juries to
convict in these cases was emphasised in this document. It was noted that in
almost all the cases mentioned the accused were young girls, and that all the
trappings of a murder trial presented a "terrible ordeal" for these particular
offenders.8
It was evident, then, that it was pointless to go through the entire rigmarole
of a murder trial and the pronouncement of the death sentence in cases where
mothers were suspected of murdering their young infants. It would have
simplified matters considerably if these offenders could have been tried for
some alternative offence where the seriousness of their actions could be
recognised, but where consideration could also be given to the conditions
under which they had committed their crimes. Concealment of birth and
manslaughter, which were frequently used as a means of avoiding severity in
these cases, were not always appropriate solutions. The former could not
apply in situations of obvious and marked violence where the fact that the
child had been killed could not be avoided. The latter could not apply to
every case because it was sometimes difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
woman had killed her infant with malice aforethought.
The response of the Irish legislature was to enact an infanticide measure
which followed the English model. Although there had been suggestions to
amend the law along this line as early as the late 1920s, the main impetus for
reform of the law on child murder in Ireland came from the 1941 report of an
informal committee of judges, which had been set up in 1939 at the request
of the Minister for Justice, Mr. Ruttledge.89 The task of this committee had
88 See National Archives Dublin: Attorney General Office file 2000/10/2921, letter
dated 22 March 1941. The Chief State Solicitors Office sent a number of other
similar memoranda to the Attorney General throughout the 1940s outlining figures
in relation to child murder in the Central Criminal Court and urging reform. See
National Archives Dublin: Attorney General Office files 2000/10/2921 & 2922,
memos dated I August 1944: 29 May 1945; 13 May 1947; 21 November 1947; 19
January 1949.
89 See National Archives Dublin: Department of Taoiseach file s. 14493, letter dated
26 April 1939. It is interesting to note that as far back as 1928 there were
suggestions that the English infanticide legislation, be adopted in Ireland.
Department of Justice file H266/61 contains a copy of the 1922 Infanticide Act,
along with the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929. Two notes are also contained in
this file. The first is dated 31 July 1928 and is signed S.A.R, which presumably
stands for S. A. Roche, the Secretary to the Department of Justice. He notes, in
relation to the 1922 Act, that "we might profitably enact an identical measure",
and he asked the Minister for Justice to examine the file. The second note, dated
13 December 1932, is also signed S.A.R. and is headed "RE our social
legislation". It advises the Minister for Justice to consider both the English
Infanticide Act 1922, and the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929, and proposes that
they should be passed in Ireland, advising the Minister to see if his "informal
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been to review the law on capital punishment with a view to its improvement
on the understanding that a total abolition of the death penalty would not be
contemplated. The "Committee appointed to Consider and Report on the
Law and Practice relating to Capital Punishment" recommended, inter alia,
that child murder should be dealt with by legislation in similar terms to the
English Infanticide Act 1938.90 In 1949, the Irish legislature followed this
recommendation and the Infanticide Act was enacted.9
committee" would help in getting them passed. There is no indication what this
informal committee was. It may well have been the Committee of Judges on
Capital Punishment, but since this group was not formed until 1939 it is unlikely
that the reference is specifically to them, unless the idea to set up a committee
along these lines was discussed as far back as 1932. It is interesting to note that
the idea to introduce legislation similar to the Infanticide Act 1922 was being
discussed over twenty years prior to the enactment of infanticide legislation in
Ireland. However, because nothing seems to have been done in relation to drafting
such legislation until the Judges' Committee on Capital Punishment presented
their report in 1941, this report will be taken as the starting point for reform.
There is no evidence in any of the files I examined that there were ever any
discussions regarding the introduction of the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929, in
the Republic of Ireland.
90 See National Archives Dublin: Department of Taoiseach files s14493 and s1331 1,
"Report of the Committee appointed to Consider and Report on the Law and
Practice Relating to Capital Punishment". The recommendations with regard to
infanticide are provided in paragraph one of this report. The committee consisted
of O'Sullivan C.J., and Maguire, O'Byrne and Hanna JJ.
91 This measure was almost identical to the Infanticide Act 1938. The same
definition of infanticide was adopted. S.1(3), previous to being amended by the
Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, 2006, provided: "A woman shall be guilty of felony,
namely, infanticide if - (a) by any wilful act or omission she causes the death of
her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, and (b) the circumstances
are such that, but for this section, the act or omission would have amounted to
murder, and (c) at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was
disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving
birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth
of the child and may for that offence be tried and punished as for manslaughter."
The main difference between the newly enacted Irish Infanticide Act and the 1938
measure was procedural in nature. Like the 1938 statute, the Irish Act empowers
the jury to return a verdict of infanticide at the trial of a woman charged with the
murder of her infant aged under twelve months, once they are satisfied that she is
guilty of infanticide (see s. 1(2)). However, unlike the 1938 Act, the Irish measure
does not seem to permit the authorities to initially charge a woman suspected of
murdering her infant with the offence of infanticide. S. I(1) of the Infanticide Act,
1949, provides: "[oln the preliminary investigation by the District Court of a
charge against a woman for the murder of her child, being a child under the age of
twelve months, the Justice may, if he thinks proper, alter the charge to one of
infanticide and sent her forward for trial on that charge." This section implies,
though it does not expressly say as such, that the initial charge against a mother
for the killing of her infant, in circumstances which point to murder, must be
murder. When introducing the Irish infanticide measure to both the Dil and
Seanad, the Minister for Justice, General MacEoin, stressed that the initial charge
against a woman suspected of murdering her infant would always be murder and
that this charge could be reduced to infanticide by a district judge only after he had
reviewed all the circumstances of the case, including the available medical
evidence. It seems that this was done to emphasise the Irish legislature's
continued respect for infant life; see Ddil Eireann Parliamentary Debates,
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The Roots of the Medical Rationale
The idea contained in the twentieth century infanticide legislation, viz. that
women could become mentally disturbed due to the effects of childbirth, was
not a novel one. Indeed, as far back as 1866 assumptions about the effects of
childbirth on women had also been put forward to explain the fact that some
women were capable of killing the vulnerable babes in their arms. A number
of witnesses before the 1866 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment drew
a distinction between mothers who murdered their infants and other
murderers which was based on the perceived mental or psychological
condition of women subsequent to childbirth. Some witnesses mentioned the
"hysterical" nature of mothers after birth;92 the "state of weakness or great
excitement" parturient women experience;" or the irresistible motives of
shame which may operate on them.94 For example, Lord Cranworth
explained: "[t]he mother has influences operating on her which cannot affect
any other person; she is hardly conscious of her acts, hardly a responsible
agent."95 James Fitzjames Stephen noted that
... women in that condition do get the strongest symptoms of
what amounts almost to temporary madness, ... they often
hardly know what they are about, and will do things that they
have no settled or deliberate intention whatever of doing." 96
During the nineteenth century, the medical profession also sought to explain
the act of maternal child murder "in a way that maintained the mythology of
motherhood and the maternal instinct".97 Psychiatric descriptions of
puerperal insanity encompassed weaknesses in mind, body and self control.98
However, as Showalter notes, the focus on puerperal mental illness failed to
recognise the fact that infanticide did not occur "randomly" in all social
classes and, essentially, ignored the social circumstances and causes of infant
murder.99 She asserts: "[riather than looking at the social meaning of
infanticide and at its contexts, doctors, lawyers and judges categorized it as
1, 100an isolated and biologically determined phenomenon...,,j.
This emergence of medical explanations for infanticide, particularly in
relation to unmarried women, is also evident in nineteenth-century Ireland.
Prior, in her study of the Criminal Lunatic Asylum in Dundrum, Dublin,
provides an excerpt from the Seventh Report of the Inspectors of Lunacy,
vol.cxv, cols.265-6, 282; Seanad Eireann Parliamentary Debates, vol.xxxvi,
col. 1472.92 B.P.P., 1866, xxi, pp.342-343, (Fitzjames Stephen).
93 ibid., p.249, (Grey Bart).94 ibid., p. 112, (Walpole).
9' ibid., p.58.
96 ibid., p.343. The Rev. Lord S. G. Osborne, however, disagreed with this analysis.
He indicated that he could not "admit the general truth of the view" that the
woman, having been seduced and deserted by the father of her child, and being
"driven to despair' from the shame of this and the burden of the child's support,
acquires "a condition a little short of insanity"; see ibid., p.475.
97 The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture 1830-1980 (1987)
p.58.
98 ibid., pp.58-59.
99 ibid., p.59.100 ibid.
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1855-1856, which, after noting that the most common form of homicide
among the female detainees at the asylum was infanticide, states:
"[g]reat commiseration is, no doubt, due to many who come
within this category [of inmate]; for we can fully imagine how
shame and anguish must weigh on an unfortunate and betrayed
female, with enfeebled system, what strong temptations induce
her to evade the censure of the world in the destruction of the
evidence of her guilt, by a crime that outrages her most
powerful instinct, maternal love of offspring."'
01
However, in spite of the growth of medical theories to explain the
"unnatural" crime of maternal child murder, it is evident, from an analysis of
the background to the enactment of the English and Irish infanticide
measures, that the necessity for law reform sprang from a desire to avoid the
death penalty and the solemn pronouncement of this sentence in cases where
mothers were convicted of killing their infants, rather than from a perception
that murdering mothers were usually mentally disturbed. By abolishing this
penalty for maternal child murder two purposes would be served. First, the
judiciary would be relieved of the uncomfortable task of terrifying convicted
women, whilst making a mockery of the death sentence. Second, juries
would not revolt against convicting women of killing their young children if
a more humane punishment were prescribed, and these offenders could be
dealt with in a more effective and just way.
In relation to this, Seaborne Davies notes that references to the "solemn
mockery" by the 1866 Commission on Capital Punishment "mark[ed] the
starting point of... reform" on the law on maternal child murder in England
and Wales.0 2 This concern over the fact that sentences were being
pronounced which were never carried into effect led to a "rare spectacle": it
was the judiciary who encouraged continuous attempts at reform up until
1922.03 Seaborne Davies claims: "[i]f any legislation could be described as
above all others the creation of the judges, it is the Infanticide Act, 1922."'04
He asserts that "the decisive factor in the achievement of the reform was ...
the judicial sentiment against the 'solemn mockery'. . .""' A review of the
101 See Prior, "Mad, not Bad: Crime, Mental Disorder and Gender in Nineteenth-
Century Ireland" in O'Donnell and McAuley, (eds.), Criminal Justice History:
Themes and Controversies from Pre-independence Ireland (2003), pp. 66-82 at
75, quoting the Seventh Report of the Inspectors of Lunacy, 1854-1855, p.19.
102 See op. cit., n.58, at p.319. The solemn mockery was not the only problem with
the law on child murder which was noted by the 1866 Commission on Capital
Punishment. Witnesses before the Commission also noted the difficultly in
obtaining convictions in these cases. Tied in with this was the problems relating
to the issue of live birth. For a very brief overview of the live birth issue, see
supra, at n.58. In Ireland, the difficulty in obtaining convictions in child murder
cases was also a significant issue; in the majority of cases where a mother was
charged with murdering her infant she was either acquitted of murder or was
disposed of by means of the offences of manslaughter or concealment of birth;
see generally, supra, text at nn.84-88. The issue of live birth does not seem to
have been considered to be a significant difficulty in Ireland; it did not receive
103 any attention by the legislature.104 ibid.. pp.319-320.
105 ibid., p.319.105 ibid., pp.339-340.
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relevant parliamentary debates in 1908, 1909 and 1922 certainly indicates
that this was the case."°
Thus, while the basis of the infanticide legislation is medical in nature, the
desire to treat mothers who killed their infants more leniently than other
intentional killers does not seem to have sprung from an established view
that a significant proportion of these women were mentally disturbed. The
pre-enactment history of the 1922, 1938 and 1949 Infanticide Acts illustrates
that while concern with the mental state of infanticidal mothers was a factor
in the reform process, it was not the determining factor. The real reasons for
reform were the desire to avoid the "solemn mockery" of the death penalty
and, in connection with this, the desire to treat with some leniency a group
of offenders who, due to the pitiable social and economic circumstances in
which they committed their offences, demanded sympathy rather than
severity. These reasons were bolstered by popular perceptions about the
connection between childbirth and mental disturbance: postpartum mental
disturbance was not the reason for the reform, but the means by which
reform was to be accomplished.
Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that puerperal and lactational
mental disturbances were used to justify the leniency extended to defendant
mothers by infanticide legislation because the real reasons for maternal child
murder were too contentious to be openly canvassed. This is evident from an
unsuccessful attempt to broaden the basis of the 1938 Infanticide Bill. 7
Lord Arnold criticised the proposed measure on the basis that it would fail to
put an end to the "black-cap farce". He stated:
".... I believe I am correct in saying that some Judges in these
cases in pronouncing the [death] sentence deliberately utter the
words unintelligibly so that the wretched woman in the dock
cannot understand what is being said. In one of these cases in
the last few years the Judge told the woman not to take any
notice of the words, and in another case a learned Judge said
"[fjor God's sake tell her it will not be carried out". We shall
all agree that happenings of that kind ought to be stopped if it
is possible, but this Bill will not do it.'
°0 8
He advocated that "mental disturbance due to distress and despair arising
from solicitude for the child and extreme poverty, or either of these" should
have been incorporated into the Bill.0 9 However, Viscount Dawson, who
introduced the Bill to the House of Lords, refused to extend his proposed
measure in this manner; he feared that to do so would make the government
more "nervous" than they already were. "
In Ireland, the medical merits of the Infanticide Act, 1949, were never
seriously canvassed during the parliamentary debates which preceded its
passage into law. Nor was the medical basis of the Infanticide Act
investigated by those involved in drafting the measure. On the contrary,
1'6 ibid., p.339.
107 Parliamentary Debates (H.L.), 1937-38, vol. 108, cols.303-304.
"' ibid., col.303.109 ibid., col.304.
110o ibid., cols.308-309.
532 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol. 58, No. 4]
notwithstanding that it was recognised that the medical profession would
probably find fault with the Bill on the ground that it encroached on the issue
of mental illness and criminal responsibility, an issue which had always led
to much disagreement between lawyers and doctors, it was positively
decided that the latter should not be consulted on the matter."' In addition,
the validity of the medical basis of the legislation was not questioned by
anyone in either house of parliament. The only reference to the medical
aspect of the measure was made by Senators Sweetman and Bigger, who,
during the debate over the Infanticide Bill in the Seanad, questioned the
necessity of including a specific reference to lactation. They did not,
however, question or discuss the validity of the medical basis."2 Indeed, the
only concerns expressed about the proposed measure were that it would
lessen the deterrent effect of the law and interfere with the sanctity of infant
life." 3
However, while it would be apt to conclude that, at least in the Irish case, the
legislature did not investigate the medical rationale of the infanticide law in
any meaningful sense, and that it certainly seemed unconcerned with the
opinions of the medical profession, it would be unfair to infer from this that
it consciously adopted a measure which it knew to be a contrivance. The
failure to question the validity of the medical foundation of the Infanticide
Act, 1949, may have been due to a belief that the existence of puerperal and
lactational mental disturbances was indubitable. Indeed, there is some
indication that contemporary medical opinion was to that effect. For
example, one medical writer stated in 1927: "[c]hildbirth and lactation entail
a severe stress on the female sex, and, under certain circumstances, are liable
to cause insanity, during the course of which attempts at infanticide and
suicide are common."'"1 4 In addition, the 1938 Bill seems to have been
drafted with the advice of medical professionals: Viscount Dawson of Penn,
who was the president of the Royal College of Physicians, informed the
House of Lords, when introducing the 1938 proposal, that this measure was
the product of the "united wisdom" of a committee of medical experts to
whom he had referred the question of infanticide."'
Beyond the Narrow "Medicine as Mercy" Paradigm
It is suggested that due to the problems with the medical basis of infanticide
legislation, it may be beneficial to look beyond a narrow view of the medical
"' See National Archives Dublin: Department of Justice file 8/144/1, memorandum
addressed "Minister", dated February, 1949. However, although they thought that
the medical authorities would fault the Bill because it dealt with the contentious
issue of mental illness in relation to criminal responsibility, they did not seem to
believe that medical experts would criticise the Bill on the basis that childbirth
and lactation did not cause mental disturbances.
112 See Seanad Eireann Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxxvi, cols. 1475-77.
113 See especially, comments of Major V. deValera; Ddil Eireann Parliamentary
Debates, vol. cxv, cols.275-82
"4 Hopwood, "Child Murder and Insanity" (1927) 73 Journal of Mental Science 95
at 95. For some other contemporary views or accounts of this topic, see: Mc
llroy, "The Influence of Parturition Upon Insanity and Crime" 22 (1927-28)
Transactions of the Medico-Legal Society 53; Jones, "Puerperal Insanity" 1
(1902) British Medical Journal 579.
Parliamentary Debates (H.L.), 1937-38, vol.108, col.308.
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model by considering the Acts in their historical context. By doing this, a
fuller understanding of the significance of the medical rationale may be
reached. It is evident from this brief examination of the background to the
enactment of the Infanticide Acts in England and in Ireland that the medical
basis of these measures is not their raison d'Otre. The reason for introducing
this legislation was to avoid the "black cap farce" and to provide for a more
efficient means of dealing with a class of murderer who for well over half a
century had been treated more compassionately than other intentional killers.
Essentially, infanticide legislation was adopted in England and Wales and the
Republic of Ireland as a means of extending leniency to mothers who killed
their infants in extenuating circumstances of a social, rather than a
psychiatric, nature. The medical basis of these measures was merely the
means by which leniency could be extended to mothers who had murdered
their infants in circumstances which attracted sympathy. It was not, however,
the reason why this leniency was being extended; the medical foundation of
these measures lent them an apparent legitimacy which the real reasons for
their enactment could not have provided. As Osborne asserts,
"... the medical rationale was never in vogue or scientifically
established. It was simply more conventional, conservative and
less contentious than the reasons for the courts' lenient
treatment of murdering mothers.""' 6
It also seems that originally the medical basis of the Act may have been
based on popular perceptions about postpartum mental disturbance rather
than actual valid medical principles. Although, medical experts seem to have
had some input into the drafting of the Infanticide Act 1938, the
parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of both the 1922 and 1938
measures reveal little concern with the medical validity of what was being
proposed. The drafters of the Irish Act certainly showed a complete lack of
interest in the opinions of medical experts; they decided not to consult them
on the proposed infanticide measure due to the potential disagreement which
they thought would arise. Thus, while it is possible that medical research at
the time the infanticide measures were enacted may have supported the
psychiatric basis of this legislation," 7 this does not seem to have been a
relevant concern; there appears to have been a lack of interest in the views of
the medical community. It seems, then, that infanticide legislation was
enacted either on the assumption that the experts would fully endorse what
was being proposed, or in the belief that because they were unlikely to
support the measure, they should not be consulted.
Essentially, the medical basis of the infanticide legislation is a legal
invention, and, as with the insanity defence, agreement between lawyers and
psychiatrists cannot be taken for granted. Thus, while medical opinion is
helpful in the debate over the legitimacy of the medical foundation of
infanticide legislation, it should not be determinative. This argument is lent
additional support by the fact that medical experts may not be able to agree
or reach any decisive conclusions on the issue of postpartum mental
disturbance. In connection with this, even if this profession could arrive at
some definite consensus, it cannot be assumed that psychiatric definitions
116 Seeop. cit., n.1, p.58.
17 See literature cited supra, at n. 114.
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will remain constant over time. It may, therefore, ultimately be damaging to
place undue reliance on psychiatric descriptions. This is evident from recent
support for the long out of favour lactation theory which casts some doubt
over the wisdom of the Irish legislature's decision to remove the reference to
lactation from the 1949 Act. Perhaps, therefore, the primary focus in the
debate over the continuing validity of the rationale of the infanticide
legislation should not be whether it can be justified on a theoretical level, but
whether it is defensible for other reasons, such as, for example, by the fact
that it appears to work well in practice."'
In conclusion, in any debate about the future of infanticide legislation it is
important to recall the reason why these measures were enacted in the first
place, and, in connection with this, that the history of maternal infant murder
indicates that in many cases treating mothers who kill their infants as
ordinary killers is an entirely futile exercise. Mothers who murder their
infants have long been recognised as a special type of offender who, in most
circumstances, should be viewed with more compassion than censure."' This
is arguably still the case, particularly where mentally or emotionally
distressed mothers kill their infants in tragic circumstances. Thus, while
infanticide legislation certainly has its faults, its dubious medical rationale
being only one of them, and while it may not be a suitable approach to take
in every case of maternal infant murder, the offence/defence of infanticide
does, by offering a more compassionate route, provide for a more
expeditious means of dealing with troubled women who kill their infants in
118 A discussion of how infanticide legislation works in practice is beyond the scope
of this article. However, research indicates that there are no problems with how
the definition of infanticide works and that the offence/defence of infanticide is
useful/beneficial in cases of maternal infant murder; see, e.g. studies cited supra,
at n.42.
119 This was not always the case. Severe legislation targeted the killing of
illegitimate infants by their "lewd" mothers during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. The 1624 "Act to prevent the destroying and murthering of bastard
children" (21 Jac. 1, c. 27) reversed the common law presumption of dead birth
and punished with death the concealment of the dead body of any illegitimate
infant by its mother. This statute effectively reversed the presumption of
innocence in these cases. See, Radzinowicz, A History of the English Criminal
Law and its Administration from 1750, vol.1 (1948), p.431; Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol.4 (11 ed. 1791), p. 19 8 . The Irish
Parliament adopted this measure verbatim in 1707 (6 Anne c. 4). For an account
of infanticide in Ireland in the eighteenth century, see Kelly, "Infanticide in
Eighteenth Century Ireland" (1992) 19 Irish Economic and Social History 5. By
the latter part of the eighteenth century, the authorities and courts in England
were effectively ignoring this 1624 Act due to its severity; see generally: Beattie,
Crime and the Courts in England 1600-1800 (1986), pp. 118-124; Francus,
"Monstrous Mothers, Monstrous Societies: Infanticide and the Rule of Law in
Restoration and Eighteenth Century England" (1997) 20 Eighteenth Century Life
133 at 133-149; Hoffer and Hull, Murdering Mothers: Infanticide in England and
New England 1558-1803 (1981), pp.65-87; Malcolmson, "Infanticide in the
Eighteenth Century" in Cockburn, (ed.), Crime in England 1550-1800 (1977),
pp. 187-201 at 197-200; McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth Century
England (1989), pp.113-114. The legislation was repealed in 1803 by
Ellenborough's Act, and the presumption of dead birth was restored for all cases
involving the murder of an infant; 43 Geo. II, c. 58.
Beyond the Medical Model: A Rationale for Infanticide .... 535
pitiable situations. Ultimately, the infanticide statutes appear to serve the
criminal justice system quite well in their current form by allowing for
special lenient treatment for deserving mothers.
Finally, it cannot be denied that criticisms of the medical foundation of
infanticide measures are troubling, not only because they call into question
the entire theoretical basis of infanticide, but also because they come from
those who are expected to provide legitimate evidential support for the
practical employment of this offence/defence at trial. The views of medical
experts should not be ignored. However, these views should not be accorded
undue significance such that they overwhelm the problems with medical
analyses of postpartum mental disturbances and the importance of the
practical origins of infanticide measures. In fact, it seems, particularly in
light of the recent Law Commission report, that any effort to amend or
abolish these measures on the basis of what medical experts argue may prove
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